

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	NIO/USSR		X		
18	D/SOVA		X		
19	C/ACIS		X		
20	NIO/SP		X		
21	NIO/GP		X		
22	ER				
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

**Remarks**

To #19: Please take the lead in determining any response needed and prepare and coordinate same.

Executive Secretary

20 Feb 86

Date

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**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

86- 0724X

February 7, 1986

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is an important letter about the Soviet 6 to 1 missile gap from our distinguished colleague Senator Jim McClure to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In two key measures of comparative U.S.-Soviet military power, ICBM and IRBM warheads, Defense Department force projections show that the gaps of about 6 to 1 currently favoring the Soviet Union will continue to widen against the U.S.

Given these official DoD projections of growing Soviet strategic superiority, we are puzzled by the following two contradictory statements from Secretary Weinberger's FY 1987 Defense Posture Statement:

1. "...the reality of nuclear parity means reduced reliance on nuclear weapons..." (p. 13)
2. "...Soviet nuclear weapons are at least equal to our own, and in many dimensions superior..." (p. 40)

The two declassified Defense Department charts released by Senator McClure strongly support the fact that the Soviets already have strategic superiority, and that the Soviet strategic superiority is growing. Contradictions of this magnitude in the Defense Posture Statement, especially on the key measure of modern military power, illustrate the disarray in U.S. defense strategy and the unilateral disarmament trends afoot within the Administration.

We are also enclosing a second Dear Colleague letter from Senator McClure which shows that Soviet military superiority will be growing over the next few years in naval and conventional forces.

Indeed, the McClure naval and conventional force projection charts make another point which also completely contradicts the thrust of Defense Secretary Weinberger's FY 1987 Defense Posture Statement. Weinberger argues that while in 1980 the U.S. was inferior to the Soviets, since then we have begun to catch up. The McClure projections show, in contrast, that we are not closing most of the gaps. The irony is that the McClure charts represent the Defense Department's own projections. In sum, Weinberger's Posture Statement is contradicted by his own data. This fundamental

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

The President  
February 7, 1986  
Page 2

contradiction is another example of the incoherence of Defense strategy and policy. The ultimate contradiction is this statement on page 37 of the Posture Statement:

"...we have been buying and fielding forces to implement policies and strategies over which there was little disagreement between this Administration and its predecessor."

This statement is in complete disagreement with the 1980 Republican Party Platform.

Mr. President, we are deeply concerned about this relentless Soviet military buildup and growing Soviet military superiority. We are equally concerned about the necessity for U.S. proportionate responses to over 50 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT and other security treaty violations. In our view, continued U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified, expired SALT II Treaty, in particular destruction of two more perfectly operational Poseidon submarines in May 1986, is unjustifiable on military, diplomatic, national security, legal, political and economic grounds.

It makes no sense to build new nuclear weapons when we are throwing away perfectly good older weapons in order to appease the Soviet Union. We do not support unilateral disarmament or appeasement, but urge instead a policy of Peace Through Strength.

If U.S. unilateral disarmament continues in the face of confirmed and acknowledged Soviet SALT Break Out and their thrust toward greater military supremacy, the U.S. strategic modernization programs and Strategic Defense Initiative will become meaningless.

Respectfully,



Enclosures:

Two Dear Colleague Letters with U.S.-Soviet Force Projection Charts

Copies to:

Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, CIA  
Director, ACDA

JAMES A. McCLURE  
IDAMO

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 28, 1986

Dear Senate and House Colleagues:

As Congress considers the new defense budget for Fiscal Year 1987 in the context of required spending reductions, it is useful to have a guide to where we are at the present compared to the Soviets in the key comparative military capabilities, and where we may be going in the future.

In two key measures of comparative U.S.-Soviet military power, the trends show that the gaps of about 6 to 1 and 7 to 1 currently favoring the Soviets will continue to widen against the U.S. This is clear in such crucial measures as nuclear warheads on Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Long Range or Intermediate Range missiles. This ominous conclusion can be drawn from the two enclosed U.S.-Soviet military force projection charts which Secretary of Defense Weinberger recently declassified at my request. These charts forecasting widening gaps go beyond what President Reagan stated recently:

"The United States is still behind the Soviet Union in virtually every kind of offensive weapon, both in conventional and in strategic weapons." (September 17, 1985)

Two sets of factors must be considered about these two comparisons, one relating to the Soviet force projection and the other the U.S. force projection. Defense Secretary Weinberger has stressed that there is a "range of uncertainty" in U.S. Intelligence estimates of current Soviet strategic forces, due to the expanding pattern of Soviet camouflage, concealment and deception, and other Soviet violations of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties such as covert launchers, prohibited warhead fractionation, and rapid reload and refire capabilities. The historical tendency of U.S. Intelligence to underestimate Soviet strategic forces, active Soviet efforts to blind and deceive U.S. Intelligence, and especially the robust Soviet ICBM and IRBM mobile missile deployment programs now underway indicate that the current 6 to 1 and 7 to 1 gaps between Soviet forces and U.S. forces will continue to grow.


The projections of U.S. forces assume at least a 3% rate of real growth in U.S. defense spending and slightly growing force levels resulting from this minimal real funding growth. However, U.S. defense spending is more likely to be significantly cut. Moreover, the minimalist MX program of only 100 missiles assumed in the ICBM warhead force projection is optimistic, because Congress has already capped MX deployment at only 50. Finally, the comparison of long range or intermediate range warheads is somewhat unrealistic, because it assumes that U.S. Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles already capped at only 572 launchers can be

compared to the Soviet SS-20 IRBM. But the Pershing II has one-third the range, one-third the number of warheads, and about one-thirtieth the explosive power of the SS-20.

In order to restore our seriously eroding retaliatory deterrent capacity against the Soviets, America is probably going to have to try to deploy better forces with less defense funding. Fortunately, maximizing the efficiency of defense spending has strong bipartisan support.

Additional recently declassified U.S.-Soviet historical armaments comparisons and force projections from the Defense Department show the same gap-widening trends for SAMs, tactical aircraft, tanks, other armored vehicles and artillery. These are available by calling Dave Sullivan, my L.A. for Defense and Foreign Affairs, on 4-6728.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jim McClure". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jim" and last name "McClure" clearly legible.

JAMES A. McCLURE  
United States Senator


enclosures:

1. Trends In ICBM Reentry Vehicles (Warheads)
2. Trends in Long Range INF Warheads

## TRENDS IN ICBM REENTRY VEHICLES (WARHEADS)



## TRENDS IN LONG-RANGE INF WARHEADS



U1942.05

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 7, 1986

Dear Senate and House Colleagues:


The most important question facing Congress in evaluating the President's FY 1987 Defense budget requests is whether or not we are restoring a military balance with the Soviet Union. The President has stated at least 8 times since 1982 that the Soviets have achieved military superiority over the United States. Are we closing the gaps of military superiority which the Soviets have opened, or are these gaps widening?


Ten charts projecting U.S.-Soviet naval, ground, tactical air and strategic forces have recently been declassified by Defense Secretary Weinberger. The gaps in favor of the Soviets are projected as widening in 5 of the 10 comparisons.

Two qualifications should be kept in mind when interpreting these projections. First, the Soviet force projection lines assume some Soviet deactivations of forces which may not occur. Second, the U.S. force projection lines assume a 3% real increase in defense spending, which may not be sustained by Congress. So as ominous as these 10 force projection charts are, they may be optimistic on both scores. All ten gaps may be widening.

Some of these projections will be included in the forthcoming Defense Department book entitled Soviet Military Power due out in late March, 1986.

Sincerely,

  
STEVE SYMMS  
United States Senator

  
JAMES MCCLURE  
United States Senator


Enclosures:

10 Declassified Defense Department Force Projection Charts



## TRENDS IN ATTACK SUBMARINES

NUMBER  
OF  
SUBS




CURRENT

TIME

PROJECTED


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## TRENDS IN MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS




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# TRENDS IN OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES




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# TRENDS IN BOMBERS (PAA)



U1942.09

# TRENDS IN SLBM LAUNCHERS



NUMBER  
OF  
LAUNCHERS


PROJECTED

TIME


CURRENT

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# TRENDS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES



# TRENDS IN TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT



USSR

U.S.

CURRENT


TIME

PROJECTED

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NUMBER  
OF  
AIRCRAFT


# TRENDS IN TANKS



U19421C




# TRENDS IN ARTILLERY



U194202

# TRENDS IN SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS




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**The Washington Times**

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1986 / PAGE 3A

**U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD FORECAST**

Source: National Intelligence Estimate, declassified June 1985

Chart by Ed Haddock, Paul Woodward / The Washington Times

# Sen. McClure sees Soviets widening '6-1' missile lead

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons gap will continue to widen over the next five years because of expected cuts in U.S. defense spending and continued growth of Soviet arsenals, says conservative Sen. James McClure.

The Idaho Republican, a member of the defense appropriations subcommittee and chairman of the energy subcommittee responsible for overseeing the U.S. nuclear warhead program, made two Pentagon charts available in a "Dear Colleague" letter to members of Congress last week.

The letter was circulated before the debate on the fiscal 1987 defense budget scheduled to begin on Capitol Hill this week. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is scheduled to deliver the Pentagon's annual military posture statement Wednesday, according to a Pentagon spokesman.

The Pentagon budget request is expected to total between \$282 billion and \$300 billion.

The charts compare U.S. and Soviet intercontinental and intermediate-range warhead numbers and show that the number of Soviet ICBM warheads will grow from the current estimated 6,400 to between 10,000 and 13,000 in 1991, according to a government defense expert.

The number of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear warheads is expected to grow from some 1,400 warheads on the SS-20 missile to a 1991 level of 1,600.

By contrast, U.S. Pershing II and cruise missile warheads will grow from the current arsenal of 140 to a projected 572, according to the defense expert.

Mr. McClure described the comparison of the intermediate-range missiles as "somewhat unrealistic" because Pershings and cruise missiles have one-third less range and

their warheads have one-thirtieth the explosive power of the SS-20.

An aide to Sen. McClure said the charts were declassified from the National Intelligence Council's 1985 assessment of Soviet strategic weapons capabilities.

"In two key measures of comparative U.S.-Soviet military power, the trends show that the gaps of 6-1 and 7-1 currently favoring the Soviets will continue to widen against the United States," the senator wrote.

The senator believes the latest estimates are conservative and the missile gap could be wider.

"The historical tendency of U.S. intelligence to underestimate Soviet strategic forces, active Soviet efforts to blind and deceive U.S. intelligence and especially the robust Soviet ICBM and IRBM mobile missile deployment programs now under way indicate that the current gaps between Soviet forces and U.S. forces will continue to grow," Mr. McClure stated.